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)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 45299

)
)

BRENDA WRIGHT,

)
)
Defendant/Respondent, )
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District for Elmore County

Honorable Jonathan Medema, District Judge, Presiding

Jay Clark, prose
P.O. Box 1026
Middleton, Idaho 83644
Plaintiff-Appellant
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Brenda Wright, prose
227 S. Davis Road
Hammett, ID 83627
Defendant-Respondent
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

Thls case involves a boundary dispute. Appellant/Plaintiff owns a mobile home and is
the assignee of rights from C & H Properties LLC (C & H} who owns the real property the mobile
home is located on and the real property that adjoins the Respondent's real property.
Appellant's mobile home was used for rental purposes and as the lower court found "From
January of 2006 to 2013, Ms. Wright [Respondent] and the tenants [of Appellant] generally
treated the fence-line as the boundary between Ms. Wright's property and C & H's property. "
(R., p. 60}.

The property was surveyed in 2009 by Wright and then during October 2013,

Wright first made claims that the fence-line was not the boundary and in fact the Appellant's
mobile home on a concrete foundation was actually located on Wright's real property. The
survey also shows the other neighbor's house, Joel Garcia, was also not on property owned by
Garcia.
B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

This is an appeal from the District Court's Memorandum of Decision and Order
Dismissing Complaint dated June 20, 2017, (R., p. 56), and subsequent Final Judgment dated
also dated June 20, 2017 {R ., p. 76.). Seventy-six (76} days after a one day court trial was held
on the merits of the case on April 5, 2017, the lower court dismissed all causes of action in this
case with prejudice based on Plaintiff/Appellant's (Clark} lack of standing. After the Court's
dismissal of the case, Clark timely filed the Notice of Appeal on August 1, 2017 (R., p. 78).
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The primary focus of th is case is whethe r the District Court was legally justified in
dismissing this case based on lack of standing.

No argument, brief, pleading or discussion of

any kind was ever brought up in regards to standing or the lack of a real party of necessary
interest prior to the decision made in this case.

No hearing was ever held or was an

opportunity given for briefing as to the legal issue of standing or the sufficiency of the
assignment of rights assigned to Clark from the deeded owner of the property in dispute.
An additional focal point is whether the additional legal findings as to the merits of the
case have any legal significance since the lower court had already dismissed the case based on
Clark's lack of standing before addressing the merits of the case.
II.

Issues Presented on Appeal

1.

Did the District Court err in ordering the dismissal of the case based on

Plaintiff/Appellant's lack of standing?
2.

Could the District Court make additional findings as to the merits of the case

after already ordering the case dismissed based on Clark's lack of standing?
3.

Did the District Court err by dismissing the action to quiet title based on the

Court's finding the assignment between C & H Properties LLC and the Plaintiff/Appellant was
inadequate as a matter of law?
4.

Did the District Court err by attempting to decide the merits of the case based on

the finding that "C & H was essentially represented by Mr. Clark at trial" (R., p. 66) even though
the case was dismissed as a matter of law because the Court already concluded that C & H was
not a party to the case?
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5.

Did the District Court err by concluding that there was " ...no evidence the fence-

line has ever been a boundary." (R., p. 72), even though the court had already made the factual
finding that as follows: "From January of 2006 to 2013, Ms. Wright and the tenants generally

treated the fence-line as the boundary between Ms. Wright's property and C & H's property."
(R., p. 60. Emphasis added.)

Ill.

Undisputed facts

A summary of the most relevant undisputed facts are as follows :
1.

Wright and her ex-husband were deeded a house and acreage from C & H on

January 6, 2006. (Exhibit 28) where Wright currently resides.
2.

That same deed also included a well agreement whereby C & H agreed to

provide well water to Wright from a well located on the C & H side of the fence-line believed to
be the boundary between the properties.
3.

Clark and C & H continuously maintained and paid for water delivery from this

well to the Wright property from the date of the deed until 2014. (Memorandum of Decision at

1, R., P. 56).
4.

Mr. Wright also deeded his interest in this well agreement to Wright on February

26, 2008.

5.

"There is a fence that runs roughly east-west between the Clark home to its

north and the Wright home to its south. The Court will call this 'the fence-line.' The fence-line
runs from S. Davis Road at its easternmost boundary to an irrigation ditch at its westernmost
end. The fence-line connects to other fences that roughly enclose a pasture or corral that lies
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between the Wright farmhouse on the south and Clark home on the north. The pasture lies
between S. Davis road to its East and the irrigation ditch to its West." (Memorandum of
Decision at 5, R., p. 60.)
6.

"Prior to the sale of property from C & H to Ms. Wright, Ms. Wright and Mr. Clark

went to the farmhouse. At that time the pasture, fence-line, farmhouse and Clark home were
in the locations the Court has determined above." {Memorandum of Decision at 5, R., p. 60.)
7.

From the date property was deeded through October 2013, Wright and Clark

{and his tenants) treated the fence-line as the boundary between the Wright property and C &
H property. (Memorandum of Decision at 5, R., p. 60).
8.

For the southern, eastern, and western boundary of her property, Wright

testified that her property line boundaries are based by other fence-lines and not by the survey
since the fence-line gives her more property on each of the other boundaries.
9.

A survey was first completed of the property August 2009. (Exhibit 69).

10.

Wright first notified Clark of the property boundary dispute in October 2013.

(Memorandum of Decision at 6, R., p. 61.)

IV. Argument
A.

The lower court failed to give Clark the opportunity to correct the real party in

interest issue as required by I.R.C.P. 17(a).
Even assuming arguendo that the assignment given to Clark was inadequate, Clark
should have still had the opportunity to correct the party of interest requirement. The first
indication made by the lower court that there was an issue as to who was the correct party to
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bring this quiet title action, was made by its ruling 76 days after the trial concluded on the
merits of this case. At no point did Wright raise the issue either by her answer to the complaint
(R., p. 30)1, or by any other objection of any kind to the assignment made to Clark.
Idaho's real party in interest rule is found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and
states in relevant part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest .... No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest;
and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action
had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
I.R.C.P. 17(a)
The purpose of this rule is discussed thoroughly in Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat.
Ass'n, 160 Idaho 181, 370 P. 3d 384, (Idaho 2016):

The purpose of this rule is to 'prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party
is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the party
plaintiff.' Conda Partnership, Inc. v. M.D. Constr. Co., 115 Idaho 902, 904, 771 P.2d 920,
922 (Ct.App.1989). Consequently, when interpreting this rule we have stated that
'[l]iberal construction should be given to this rule and courts should 'further the policy
favoring the just resolution of actions - providing litigants their day in court."Hayward
v.
Valley
Vista
Care
Corp., 136
Idaho 342, 348, 33 P.3d 816, 822
(2001) (quoting Conda, 115 Idaho at 904, 771 P.2d at 922). (Id. at 390).
The Houpts case requires that the party that was found to lack standing to be given a
reasonable time to cure the defect through " ...'ratification ... by, or joinder or substitution of,'

1

Neither Wright or Glenns Ferry Highway District answered the Amended Complaint. The court never gave an

explanation as to why these procedural deficiencies were ignored but instead acted as the amended complaint
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the real party in interest. Accordingly, under I.R.C.P. 17(a), Houpts must be allowed the
opportunity to cure any defect in the real party of interest. " Id at 390.
Here no such opportunity was given Clark. The judgment dismissing this action to quiet
title with prejudice was ordered the same day the Memorandum was issued, June 20, 2017.
Since this was the first time Clark had any notice that his standing was defective, Clark was
given no opportunity to ratify, join or substitute another real party in interest, C & H.
The assignment was entitled "Assignment of Disputed Property Rights."

2

On page 11 of

the lower court's decision the court held as follows :
"Mr. Clark's action to quiet title depends upon whatever title or rights in the land he
received from C & H. Because the Court has determined that the 'assignment of disputed real
property rights' was insufficient as a matter of law to convey any interest in real property, Mr.
Clark's action to quiet title must be dismissed." (R., p. 66.)
This finding that the assignment fails was because the lower court believed it must be a
deed and the assignment was therefore not adequate to convey real property. However, the
assignment itself when read in its entirety purports to transfer rights to disputed property
which was yet to be adjudicated, not to deed real property. The fact that the assignment
names Wright as disputing that ownership is a clear indication that the issue of ownership was
not certain and therefore may result in litigation.

superseded the original complaint.
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Idaho law allows for disputed rights and causes of action to be assigned. "Regarding
the first right, it is settled in Idaho that a cause of action, or 'thing in action,' may be assigned.

I.C. § 55-402. See Whitehead v. Van Leuven, 347 F. Supp. 505 (D.ldaho 1972);Casady v. Scott, 40
Idaho 137, 237 P. 415 (1924)." Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P. 2d 1102, at
1103-1104 (Court of Appeals 1983).
Idaho Code §55-402 reads:
TRANSFER AND DEVOLUTION OF THINGS IN ACTION. A thing in action arising out of the
violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the
owner. Upon the death of the owner it passes to his personal representatives, except
where, in the cases provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, it passes to his devisees or
successor in office.

Here C & H transferred by assignment a perceived "violation of a right of property" as is
allowed under Idaho law. Therefore Clark was a necessary party to this action and the lowercourt's dismissal of the quiet title action should be reversed. Even assuming the assignment
was not sufficient, the lower court's ruling should be reversed and remanded by allowing C & H
a reasonable opportunity to join in this case.
B.

The lower court's finding that C & H was "essentially represented" by Clark as a

rationale for making findings on the merits of the case conflicts with the court's ruling that C

& H was not a party to the case.

2

Court refers to the assignment as admitted in evidence and marked exhibit 33. (R., p. 66). However, no such

exhibit can be found in the record under that number or any other number.
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The court held on Page 11 of its ruling as follows: "The Court is not unaware that this
decision does little to resolve the dispute between Ms. Wright and C & H.

Because this

controversy is likely to continue and because C & H was essentially represented by Mr. Clark at
trial, the Court will address some of Mr. Clark's other arguments about why he believes the
Court should quiet title to him if he had in fact received title from C & H." (R., p. 66}.
This part of the lower court's decision directly contradicts other findings made in the
same memorandum. The court's attempt to make a ruling on the merits of the case by a
finding that Clark was somehow representing C & H has no basis in law or fact.
The lower court states on Page 7 that " ...C & H has never appeared in this lawsuit." (R.,
p. 62.) Clearly Clark cannot represent a party other then himself since he is not an attorney.

3

This point is even acknowledged in the court's footnote on page 1 of its memorandum. (R., p.
56.). In addition, there is no evidence that Clark ever attempted to represent C & H. There can
be no mistake about this.
The court also acknowledges that C & H is its own legal and separate entity apart from
Clark: "Nonetheless, Mr. Clark and C & H are separate entities under the law. I.C. § 30-25-108
formerly ID. ST. § 30-6-104. [footnote deleted] . (R., p. 62.) The fact that Clark may have been a

3

It is well known that Clark bas been a full time farmer for over ten years and bis license to practice law became

inactive several years prior to the initiation of this case.
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co-manager of C & H does not have any legal bearing on whether C & H is a party to the case.

There was certainly no evidence that Clark was ever a member of that LLC.

4

This is a very strange legal position the lower court has made. First the lower court
dismisses the quiet title action because C & H is not a party. Then the then the lower court
makes further rulings on the case based on the presumption that C & H is a party based on
Clark's representation of C & H. These are opposing and contradictory legal conclusions made
by the same court in the same decision. One of these conclusions must be in error because
they directly oppose the other. Therefore there must be reversible error in this case.
Because C & H was not a party to this case this court erred in making findings on the
merits of this case as if C & H was a party to the case and at the same time.
C.

The lower court's failure to consider any evidence that arose from the time

prior to C & H's assignment to Clark means much of the competent evidence necessary to
decide the merits of the case was ignored.
Troubling and confusing is that even after the lower dismisses the quiet title action for
failing to add a party, the court goes on to purportedly reach findings on the merits of the case.
The court appears to accomplish this by ignoring all evidence of what transpired between
Wright and C & H between 2006 and 2014 - a critical period of time that should be considered
to determine whether there was a boundary by agreement.

4

There can be no true findings on

As to Clark' s ownership rights to the mobile home, no issue was raised at trial nor evidence presented about when

Clark acquired at least some rights to that mobile home or whether those rights were also by assignment or by title.
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the merits since the court ignored a vast amount of competent and admitted evidence
presented at trial for the same reason the court already had dismissed this case - C & H was not
a party.
The court held; "There is certainly no evidence from which this Court can infer an
agreement between Ms. Wright and Mr. Clark to fix the boundary between her property and
his at the fence-line subsequent to Mr. Clark acquiring the property from C & H." (R., p. 71).
Instead of reviewing the evidence for what had transpired since Wright acquired the property
in 2006, the court would only consider what had transpired between June 2014 and the filing of
this action in November 2014 - just a few short months. (R., p. 71.) This drastic narrowing of
the window of the relevant time period to find an expressed, inferred or implied agreement
between the parties was dispositive to the outcome of this case since it eviscerated nearly all
evidence admitted at trial. This was in error.

1.

Fence-line was the boundary, not the later surveyed lot lines.

The facts of this case most closely follow other boundary by agreement or boundary by
acquiescence cases with the elements set forth in the case of Boyd-Davis v. Baker, 339 P. 3d
749 (Idaho 2014):
Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) there must be an
uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the
boundary."Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 271, 127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005). "Idaho case
law demonstrates that an agreement, either express or implied, must exist to establish a
boundary by agreement or acquiescence." Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 495, 50 P.3d
987, 990 (2002). "A long period of acquiescence by one party to another party's use of
the disputed property provides a factual basis from which an agreement can be
inferred." Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 400, 34 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2001).
"Acquiescence, by itself, does not constitute a boundary by agreement. As we explained
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in Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626 (1990), 'boundary by acquiescence' is
simply another name attached to the doctrine of boundary by agreement; it is not a
separate legal theory." Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 595-96, 166 P.3d 382, 385-86
(2007).
The undisputed evidence admitted at trial clearly supports the fact the fence-line
between the parties was treated as the property boundary from the time Wright first visited
the property with Clark in late 2005 until Wright first notified Clark of a her dispute with the
boundary in October 2013. The court acknowledged this undisputed fact which was recited
near the bottom of Page 5 of the Memorandum: "From January of 2006 to 2013, Ms. Wright
and the tenants [of Clark's] generally treated the fence-line as the boundary between Ms.
Wright's property and C & H's property." (R., p. 60).
It was reasonable for the parties to assume the fence was the boundary for a number of
reasons. The parties agreed that Wright was to purchase a parcel of 8 lots as identified from
the townsite of Medbury. But Medbury was never built and only a handful of houses in that
area are now where many lots, streets, and alleys were platted but the Medbury streets and
alleys were never constructed.
The court describes the area as follows:
"The lot and block designations come from a plat recorded in 1909 by C.H. Hammett,
then president of the Fruitland Acreage Company, Limited. With the assistance of one R.S.
Fessendess, a civil engineer and surveyor, Mr. Hammett platted out what he intended to
become the Townsite of Medbury. The townsite was to be located on the south side of the
Oregon Shortline Railroad tracks where they pass through Section 35. As platted, the township
was to be located in the Northwestern quarter of Section 35. The Townsite was platted to be
just west of where the United States' Postal Service Office for Hammett, Idaho is now located.
The town site of Med bury was never developed." (R., p. 58.)
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It was also undisputed at trial that none of the parties realized for years that the

adjacent homes were also built without any regard to the original plat map (even a mobile
home owned by Joel Garcia, who testified at trial, was installed on a foundation in 2007 just
north of the Clark residence is located on land owned by C & H if the survey was followed) nor
that South Davis Road, the only road near the property in question was also not located on
property reserved for a street. As Exhibit 2 shows from Google Earth, the lot lines from the
obsolete townsite were not observed while neighboring structures were built, evidence that
none of the original lot lines were known the parties for at a number of years after the sale.
The information available at the time of the transaction was that the property consisted
simply 8 city lots each 50 feet wide and each approximately 170 feet long. (The survey, exhibit
69, confirms the size of these city lots.) It was also undisputed that the parties walked the
property with a measuring tape between the fence-line believed to be the southern boundary
of Wright's property and the fence-line believed to be the northern boundary of the Wright
property and the boundary with the C & H property to confirm the distance of the property
from the north to south as nearly 400 feet (8 times 50 feet.) These very old fence-lines by all
accounts seemed to be the long relied upon boundary lines.

The below image of the

"Townsite of Med bury" was marked as "Plaintiffs Exhibit 2" and is listed as Exhibit 18 in the
official Court Record. This is the only known existing plat map of the area. The lots in question
are highlighted in green and are located in the upper far left hand corner of the drawing. South
Davis Road is not located in the parcel listed as "3

rd

Street West" but is located to the east of

that. Most of the area to the east and west of the subject property are open fields.
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The boundary lines on both the east and the west side of the property have been a non
issue since South Davis road was the boundary on the east side of the property and a canal was
the boundary on the west side of the property. Because these features could easily be seen
from the large poster board exhibit from Google Earth, exhibit 2, which had the lot boundaries
overlaid to compare with actual fence-line boundaries which was then compared with the
measurements and all references illustrated on the survey, exhibit 69, it was relatively easy to
establish at trial that Wright actually enjoyed more square footage of land then her and her exhusband originally bargained for, but also because unknown to the parties at the time, two
never used parcels reserved for streets were also within the Wright's property.
It would be easy to assume that Wright simple wants her property boundary to follow
the survey lines of the eight city lots as stated in the deed which would effectively deny Clark
the land on which his mobile home has set on a foundation for decades. But Wright clearly
does not want to just follow the survey as the final declaration of what property she owns.
Wright readily admitted at all times during this case that she also owns at least the additional
30 feet on the east side of those lots up to where South Davis road is located; that she also
claims ownership to at least 25 feet of land on the west side of those lots to the canal, and that
her southern property boundary extends far south of her where her boundary would be (where
Lot 6, Block 32 ends).

Otherwise, Wright's southern line would bisect her "Granny Shed"
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(exhibit 5) 5 located next to her residence. Instead, Wright insists that shed is well within her
property only because the fence-line is far south of there - not because of a surveyed line. This
is what Wright testified to, that her true property line on the south side of her property is
known other then the long standing fence-line and not according to the survey.
The two unused parcels reserved for streets within the Wright property, that were not
known to the parties at the time of the transaction are 60 foot wide and at least 225 long
11

11

parcels that were reserved within the townsite for Second Avenue North" and First Avenue
North". There is no evidence that these two parcels were ever used as streets or that there was
ever any construction attempted whatsoever. There is nothing to indicate this land is anything
but part of the lots deeded to the Wrights. Even when comparing the Wright horse pasture
with the plat map of the townsite (exhibit 18, faxed dated April 8, 2005), Second Ave North has
been drawn so that it appears to end to east of those lots instead of bisecting those lots. While
viewing the plat map, it is easy to see how the parties would have assumed by measuring the
distance between the fence-lines that the fence-lines were in fact the correct boundaries.
While the Warranty Deed to the Wrights dated January 11, 2006, (Exhibit 28) grants to
the Wrights "portions of streets and alley ways [sic) as reverted to the owners of said lots at the

5

Marked number "24" the "Granny Shed" can be seen as how it looked the summer before Wright purchased the

property. It is a very old structure built out of railroad ties and both parties agree it was most likely the original
home built on the Wright property. The photo is taken looking west so that the southern boundary of the Wright
property as claimed by Wright would be the fence-line to the far left of the shed beyond the trees visible and NOT
according to her own survey.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF- 18

time of the vacation of said plat ... " there is no evidence that either party thought this language

had any real bearing as to the location of the fence-lines as the boundaries. Both sides offered
into evidence proof of this by way of a Grant Deed dated AND recorded on February 26, 2008.
See Clark's proposed exhibit 16 and Wright's proposed exhibit 20. Inexplicably, the lower court
denied both parties request to admit the same recorded deed to the property in question. This
Grant Deed is extremely probative to this case and there is no valid legal reason to exclude it
from evidence so it should be admitted. (By the lower court's own rationale, if this recorded
deed simply did not exist then this would make Melvin Wright another necessary party to this
case since he was one of the two original grantees to the real property in question.)
The Grant Deed purports to convey the same 8 lots to Wright but does not include any
language granting the "portions of streets and alleyways" that was included in both the original
deed and the Purchase and Sales Agreement. This is strong evidence that even after two years
of ownership Wright was still completely unaware that the seemingly congruent block of lots
she owned was in fact bisected by never developed and therefore invisible streets. Wright's
insistence on following the surveyed boundaries of lots, but only where it benefits her, now has
another strange twist. If the property lines where not agreed to by fence-line but only by a
survey taken several years later, then this 60 foot by 225 feet of land, if granted to the Wrights
by the January 11, 2006, deed, is still owned also by Melvin Wright. Surely that also was not
Wright's intention.
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The only logical conclusion that can be made her is that both Melvin and Brenda Wright
recognized the fence-lines, and not the surveyed lot lines as the boundary for their community
real property at the time of their divorce.
This also only makes sense when compared to the day to day and common usage of the
property. There only use ever made by Wright of the property between the residences was as a
horse pasture. The horses and residents of the Wright property stayed on their side of the
fence and the Clark tenants stayed on their side of the fence. There was no evidence to dispute
the fact that this day to day activity continued for at least 2800 days (7 years and 10 months
from January 6, 2006 until October 2013.)
In short, the Wrights believed they were purchasing around two acres of land and the
square footage of their property based on the existing fence-lines confirmed this. None of the
parties to this agreement had any reason to believe the fence-lines were not the true boundary.
The lower court erred by not considering any of th is evidence.

2.

The location of the shared well is a fixed point that is definitive as to where the

property boundary line was believed to be.
Just a few feet to the north of the fence-line boundary between the parties there is the
domestic well that provides water to both of the residences of the parties but also to the
residence just to the north of Clark, the Garcia residence (as marked on the Google Earth photo,
exhibit 2). It was undisputed that C & H paid for the upkeep of this well and the operation of
this well at all times up until shortly before this case was filed. C & H also had a separate
electrical meter installed by the well to monitor the cost of the water to the three houses. It is
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also undisputed that from the time the Wrights purchased the property until October 2013,
Wright accepted this well as being owned, controlled and managed by C & H property. There is
no evidence that she ever paid for any upkeep or maintenance of that well during those years.
The Memorandum states as follows:

"There is a well that currently services Ms. Wright's

farmhouse, the Clark home, and the Garcia home. The well is to the north of the fence-line.
The well is located between the fence-line and the Clark home."

{R., p. 60). Also, "In 2014,

Ms. Wright began removing property from around the well head and began attempting to
restrict access to the well by Mr. Clark and Mr. Garcia." (R., p. 61.)
With the Wright home having no usable well, it has always been critical to Wright's
habitation of her residence and livestock to have water. The location of the only working well
and its continued operation would have been of key interest at the time of purchase of the
property and every day thereafter.

It is also reasonable to assume that had the Wrights

believed that they were purchasing real property that included a working well there would be
no reason to enter into a well sharing agreement with the adjoining landowner. But here all
parties clearly believed the well was located on C & H property because the Purchase and Sales
contract (exhibit 1), the Warranty Deed (exhibit 28), and the Grant Deed (the February 28' 2008
deed between Melvin and Brenda Wright both exhibits 16 and 20), all contain the identical
language regarding the sharing of this well:
"Appurtenant to the above described real property is an easement across the
neighboring property know as 165 S. Davis Road [the Clark residence], Hammett, Idaho,
for water delivery, shared well water and pump rights and utilities as necessary for full
enjoyment and habitation of said property." (Exhibit 1, 16, 20, and 28. Emphasis
added.)
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By the survey, this well is at least 100 feet into Wright's property, but by all accounts the
parties clearly intended and acted thereon with the believe that the well was not on the Wright
property. Not until October 2013 - seven years and ten months of utilizing this water nearly
every day from the date of the Warranty Deed did this issue come up, and prior to that was a
clear course of conduct. That is seven years and ten months of Wright acting as another party
is responsible for delivering water to her residence from another parcel of land.

This was not

just an assumed change in property boundaries or a boundary by acquiescence, but an
expressed and written change in the boundary per the agreement where Defendant agreed that
the well was not on her property.

No assumption here is necessary as to a determination of

what the that parties clearly intended as the property boundary between these two houses.
Another boundary by acquiescence case is, Wells v. Williamson, 794 P. 2d 626 - Idaho:
Supreme Court 1990, also involved a fence-line on Eagle Island. The facts of the Wells case are
very similar to the case at hand . A survey was completed in that case some years after the two
adjoining landowners had also treated a fence-line as the boundary. The Idaho Supreme Court
upheld the fence-line as the boundary even though it was also some distance from what the

boundary would have been via a survey. "Hence, there must be an uncertain or disputed
boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. The agreement need not be
express, but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the
parties. Edge/fer v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 262 P.2d 1006 (1953). The payment of property
taxes by the party seeking possession of the disputed property is also not required. Trappett v.
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Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592 (1981). And, finally, no particular time is required for the

period of acquiescence. "Id. at 630.
Here we have a fence-line boundary which was not certain, since there is no evidence of
a prior survey, but the fence-line was relied upon for nearly eight years but is now disputed, as
in Wells case, by a subsequent survey completed some years later.

Second, there was an

expressed agreement via the well sharing agreement whereby the parties agreed that the
property boundary was south of the well (the fence-line) to leave the well owned by C & H.
There were also many years the parties respecting the fence-line as the boundary which is
undisputed evidence of the expressed agreement.
ln Sims v. Doker, 154 Idaho 975, 303 P. 3d 1231 (Idaho 2013), the Idaho Supreme Court
also found that a fence-line shou ld be the property line even though it deviated substantially
from a survey done after the property was acquired. The Court in that case also discussed w hat
was needed to be shown as to the history of the fence-line:
No one knows when the fence was built. No one knows why the fence was built, or why
it was built in the location where it was built. There is no evidence as to who owned the
property on either side of the fence when it was built, or if the same person owned the
property on both sides of the fence at the time it was built. There is no evidence to

disprove that the fence was intended to be a boundary. (Id at 1233, citing the district
court.)
This is the same situation we have in th is case. In spite of this the lower court found as
follows: "ln any event, there is no evidence that Ms. Wright pu rchased her land with notice
that landowners prior to C & H had treated that fence as a boundary between the property C &
H was selling her and the property C & H was reserving for itself." (R., p. 72). The lower court
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mistakenly required evidence that previous landowners also treated the fence-line as a
boundary. This is certainly not the law and is the opposite of what the Sims case required for a
boundary by agreement and is therefore in error.
Since there was ample and undisputed evidence that the fence-line was the agreed
upon property line boundary, it was in error for the lower court to ignore this well agreement
as an expressed agreement as to where the property boundary should be.

D.

Serious factual errors made by the lower-court.

The lower court states on page 1 of the Memorandum, "The well has also been modified
to provide water to another mobile home which C & H rents to others." (R., p. 56). The only
other mobile home referred to this case is the one located just to the north of the Clark mobile
home. Joel Garcia testified in court that he in fact owns that mobile home and it is installed on
a concrete foundation . (See exhibits 2 and 13 which show Mr. Garcia's home and land that he
owns around his home if the fence-line boundaries are followed and not the survey.)
If the boundaries were to be drawn according to the survey instead of the long standing
fence-lines, this would severely jeopardize Mr. Garcia since this would also put his home on
land that he does not own, which would be on the two lots that C & H owns, according to the
survey. There was no evidence presented at trial that Mr. Garcia was ever the tenant of either
Clark or C & H.
V. Conclusion

With significant legal and factual issues at issue, Appellant, Jay Clark, respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the holdings of the District Court and that this Court render a
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decision in favor of the Appellant or that this case be remanded for further proceedings as
deemed appropriate.
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